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Professor Andrews argues that the American Law Insti-
tute's Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Re-
statement and Recommendations fails to consider the recent
evolution of the large publicly held corporation and the rela-
tionship among shareholders, the board, and management. He
suggests that the legal and management communities work to-
gether to solve the problems in corporate governance.
The effrontery of my title, especially in a company so highly
educated in the law, may seem less outrageous if I say at once that
I am not declaring war. In fact, I propose an overdue rapproche-
ment between the legal profession and business management. Fur-
thermore, within the legal profession, I propose an accord between
lawyers in independent partnerships and government agencies on
the one hand, and law schools and the law department of corpora-
tions on the other. Although this reconciliation is subversive of the
adversarial process of seeking truth and destructive of status dis-
tinctions within the profession, it is essential to economic and so-
cial progress.
En route to armistice, I do not intend to belabor in detail the
recommendations of the American Law Institute's Draft Principles
of Corporate Governance ("ALI Draft").' Instead, I hope to stimu-
late inquiry into why the recommendations have failed (for those
who, like me, think they have)2 and into why a storm has arisen
over the ALI Draft's proposals (for those who still support this ap-
proach to reform).
It is now well known that the recommendations have received
overwhelming disapproval by the management community and the
* Professor Andrews delivered the following remarks at the Eighth Annual Baron de
Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, University of Miami School of Law, March 4, 1983. Members
of the University of Miami Law Review edited his remarks and footnotes for publication.
** Donald K. David Professor of Business Administration, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University; Editor, Harvard Business Review.
1. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND REcOMMENDA-
TIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
2. I have already attempted criticism in Andrews, Rigid Rules Will Not Make Good
Boards, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 34.
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corporate bar. The chorus of objections has culminated in an elab-
orate refutation by a law firm retained by the Business Round-
table.3 The intensity of the rejection, as I will attempt to show,
does not come simply from the wish to perpetuate the autonomy of
the publicly held corporation. Opposition to the Draft centers in
the conviction that the recommendations, when considered against
the subtlety and complexity of corporate governance, are unrealis-
tic and irrelevant. This is partly because the roots of the new pro-
posals come from the adversarial logic of regulatory law instead of
from the observation and direct experience of the management of
large corporations. I do not support all of the Roundtable's refuta-
tion of the ALI Reporters' reasoning, but I do know from research
and my own experience that the recommendations do not take into
account the recent evolution of the large corporation as the domi-
nant institution of our society, with relationships ranging far be-
yond the corporation's original obligations to shareholders. More-
over, the recommendations do not recognize the way in which
management and directors do and must relate to each other if the
corporation is to achieve its purpose.
Without attempting to characterize the biases that surface in
the controversies created by the Draft, I find disturbing the impli-
cation that legal scholars, of which the ALI Reporters4 are distin-
guished representatives, have alienated themselves from under-
standing a complex human and social process. The alienation
results from the thought processes inculcated by the legal scholars'
discipline and culture. Economists, political scientists, and other
highly trained specialists also lack comprehension of the untidy
conceptual world of the generalists.
Professor Eisenberg is correct in observing that corporation
law is obsolete.' He and his colleagues, however, may not under-
stand the reasons why black letter law lags behind common law
3. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE:
RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" (1983). Although my article criticizing the ALI Draft,
Andrews, supra note 2, is reprinted as Exhibit A in the Roundtable's statement, the Round-
table did not retain me in connection with its statement or position. Ira M. Millstein and
Daniel J. Block of Weil, Gotshal & Manges are the senior authors of this statement.
4. The Reporters are Stanley A. Kaplan, Chicago, Chief Reporter; Harvey J.
Goldschmid, Columbia University School of Law, Deputy Chief Reporter and Reporter for
Part IV; Melvin A. Eisenberg, University of California School of Law, Berkeley, Reporter
for Parts I, II, and III; and John C. Coffee, Jr., Columbia University School of Law, Re-
porter for Part VII.
5. See Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 187 (1983).
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and case law. Needs, motives, and initiatives not acknowledged in
statutes energize the corporation. As a response to the forces that
shape it, the corporation has accumulated responsibilities unrecog-
nized in traditional corporation law and the attempted moderniza-
tion embodied in the Model Business Corporation Act. With the
implied consent of its customers, members, and interested public,
the corporation sprang loose long ago from traditional economic
and legal models. Any attempt to rebottle this corporate genie in
its original vessel is a futile exercise, exposing the inadequacy of
outmoded economic models.
We should not feel hardpressed to devise controls to restrain a
spirit ominously unbottled. Market forces and detailed regulatory
apparatus check the power of the corporation. There may still be
unsolved problems of logical legitimacy, but there are no claims of
a great crisis of misbehavior or irresponsibility. Gross abuses are
presently subject to prosecution.
Unlike the Roundtable, I believe that serious problems remain
in management performance, in executive compensation, in the
leadership and functioning of boards of directors, and in the struc-
ture of the relationships (different in each company), in which
management and boards are enmeshed. But these problems lie be-
yond the reach of the law. They involve issues, not of legality or
illegality, but of professional competence and responsibility. The
exercise of ethical leadership in organizations requires values and
skills in intricate combinations that cannot be prescribed by black
letter law.
I will emphasize the apparent intellectual origins of the ALI
Draft's recommendations, not their substance. The definition of
the "objective and conduct of the business corporation" as corpo-
rate profit and shareholder gain (limited by reasonable deductions
for compliance with the law, acknowledgement of ethical princi-
ples, and philanthropy)6 originates in an obsolete and simplistic ec-
onomic theory. Even though management and economic circles
subscribe to the definition, sometimes without the exceptions, the
definition does not synchronize with reality or capture the com-
plexity of real life in the corporation. Adherence by responsible
business people to this rationale is possible under the ingenuous
proposition that contributions in the name of corporate responsi-
bility and other modifications of single-minded pursuit of profit
made today, will somehow redound to the shareholders' wealth to-
6. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 2.01.
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morrow. For the less responsible corporations, the single-purpose
profit-maximization hypothesis justifies hostile takeovers, such as
the Bendix-Martin Marietta extravaganza. The hypothesis once
led to the justification of questionable payments as ethical because
the payments benefited shareholders. The Roundtable sidesteps
controversy by taking no exception to the ALI definition, despite
the difference in its own interpretation of the relationship of eco-
nomic and noneconomic objectives.'
The maximization of shareholder wealth is no longer the sim-
ple single purpose of the universe we name the large publicly held
corporation. The old model of ownership, which is still vital in the
small firm, breaks down under the behavior of shareholders of
large corporations who come and go on the spur of the moment,
assume no responsibility of ownership, and invest and sell without
knowledge of their corporation's capability and intentions. Al-
though shareholders own shares, they expect to exercise no influ-
ence on management decisions. In addition, institutional and other
less speculative investors expect that their freedom to sell under
the so-called "Wall Street rule" is more important than enhance-
ment of their power over board and management decisions.
The place of profit and the timing of its realization in the hier-
archy of corporate purposes can be debated at length. Profit is the
undeniably essential result of a corporation's mission to apply its
financial and human resources to the production of goods and ser-
vices to a public that thinks it needs those goods and services. In
the formulation and execution of the long-term strategy of the
large firm, profit at a planned level of return is the outcome of a
complicated orchestration of risk and opportunity, of short- and
long-term combinations of investment and return, and of intricate,
if sometimes improvisatory, interactions of management, share-
holder, employee, and customer interest. Richard W. Duesenberg,
a member of the ALI, recently wrote, "[Ejarning a profit is no
more the purpose of a business than eating is the purpose of liv-
ing." Let us skip the rest of this argument. I ask, however, that
7. Representative Henry S. Reuss, Chairman of the Congressional Joint Economic
Committee, characterized the Bendix Corporation takeover as an "embarrassing scene of
four corporations all trying to gobble each other up" and as a "spectacular misuse" of funds.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1982, § 1, at 37, col. 1. The four corporations battling for control were
Bendix, Martin Marietta, the Allied Corporation, and the United Technologies Corporation.
The battle resulted in the merger of Allied and Bendix. Id.
8. See The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors
of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2096-103 (1978).
9. Duesenberg, Governance, Who Knows What's Best?, CORP. DIRECTOR, Nov.-Dec.
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you acknowledge that law should not be worded as if it were not
taking place.
Behind the Draft Restatement's rigid recommendations to im-
pose a single model of the monitoring-overseeing board and a man-
dated corporate structure,1" there appears a complex series of as-
sumptions. The model of the board policing the management, lest
the managers make off with the corporation's assets, promotes an
adversarial relationship between an errant management and a vigi-
lant board of overseers. This model is reminiscent of the old mu-
tual hostility between business people and their cynical observers
in the Federal Trade Commission and in the Department of Jus-
tice. The Reporters have applied the economic calculus governing
the corporation to the individual, expecting him to pursue personal
profit at the expense of the corporation, just as they expect the
corporation to do at the expense of its customers.11 The corpora-
tion is so prone to lawlessness, apparently the inevitable result of
profit maximization, that the ALI Draft specifically directs the
board to see to it that the corporation obeys the law.12
It is interesting to note why Professor Fischel of Northwestern
University Law School contests this recommendation of the Re-
porters."3 In his total loyalty to the concept that the board's sole
responsibility is the enhancement of shareholder wealth, Fischel
contends that if it costs more to observe than to violate the law,
the costs should not be incurred: "[I]f the expected costs of fines
are less than the costs of installing compliance programs, the
proper course to maximize shareholders' wealth is to do nothing
and pay the fines.1 14 Here is a potentially classic reductio ad ab-
surdum of the profit maximization model of the corporation. Its
1982, at 1, 2. Mr. Duesenberg is Senior Vice-President of Monsanto Corporation.
10. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 3.01-.03, .05-.06; see also id. § 3.07. "At least
five kinds of boards have been categorized in a recent study: the legitimating (most perfunc-
tory), the advisory (somewhat less distant but casual), the judicial (closest to the monitor-
ing model), the dominating (highly managerial), and the participating board." Andrews,
supra note 2, at 39 (citing J. Lynch, Activating the Board of Directors (1979) (unpublished
doctoral thesis, Harvard Business School)).
11. Cf. Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARv. L. REv. 597 (1982). Objecting to "some conception of 'fairness,'" id. at 628, instead of
categorical legal prohibition, in appraising potential conflict of interest in transactions be-
tween management and the firms, Professor Brudney writes, "Conflicts of interest are inevi-
table in management's relationship to the firm, at least on the assumption that managers
may be viewed as rational economic agents who wish to divert as much of their principal's
assets to themselves as they can." Id. at 629 n.83.
12. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 2.01(a); see also id. § 2.01 comment f, at 24.
13. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982).
14. Id. at 1290 (footnote omitted).
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amorality and inherent impracticality are not to be ascribed to the
ALI Reporters. Fischel's hypothesis, however, illustrates the dan-
ger of overreliance on a single model of the corporation and the
care with which complications must be introduced into the model.
The better question for the ALI Reporters is how can a board
effectively enforce law compliance programs when the management
depends in large part upon the morality and good faith of the
managers of its decentralized profit centers. Compliance with the
law, and ethical and responsible behavior, compose an integral part
of the corporation's total strategy; they are part of its definition of
itself and its mission. Morality and good faith decline and flourish
in the corporation, as in all institutions, guided by the professional
quality and competence of its leadership and the norms of its soci-
ety. Enacting a law to force somebody to obey existing law is a
"catch-22" pass at human fallibility.
The drawing of a logical straight line from any concept to its
consequences, to the exclusion of other concepts and their inherent
consequences, exposes the shortcomings of a one-dimensional view
of a complicated human organization. The political scientists'
model of a democratic society leads, in the absence of all other
factors, to legislation encouraging shareholder democracy and to
proposals for the election of constituency representatives. The ba-
ses for this model are two erroneous assumptions: shareholder de-
mocracy is of interest to shareholders, and the hierarchical struc-
ture of authority in corporations is not an inevitable consequence
of the life and death necessity for efficiency in competition.
The desire for precision and the distaste for ambiguity inher-
ent in legal analysis may lead to fruitless deductions from oversim-
plified premises. Something else besides unfamiliarity with the cor-
poration has to explain the ALI Draft's arbitrary imposition, on
every kind of large corporation, of not only a single corporate pur-
pose, but also a single kind of board. I sense in the ALI Draft
something that is explicit in the writing of other legal scholars-a
deep distrust of business, perhaps derived from the proposition
that when profit is paramount, greed is its inevitable servant.
The universal legal distrust of the corporation may be a result
of the fact that lawyers see more violations of law than observance
of law. Their loyalty to the doctrine of self-interest may include a
hidden abhorrence leading them to a dim view of professional in-
tegrity in business. In any case, Professor Coffee's affirmation in
the ALI Draft of an old opinion of the Supreme Court-that the
shareholders' derivative suit is the principal assurance of corporate
[Vol. 37:213
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integrity-is the apotheosis of distrust and a singularly provocative
expression of hostility offered by one profession to another.15
It is not surprising that the business community returns this
lapse of polite antagonism; it huffs and puffs at the cost, waste,
and distortion of litigation that loses problems addressed and opti-
mum solutions sought in the technicalities and special pleading of
adversarial proceedings. Does the inevitable familiarity of lawyers
with corporate wrongdoing lead to a jaundiced view of executive
integrity? Are lawyers unfamiliar with the fact that business man-
agement spans a fuller range of human accomplishment and falli-
bility than do the more ritualized professions? Direct inquiry into
the normal course -of corporate decisionmaking might reduce the
suspicion of business that breeds a sense of crisis. This imagined
crisis has led to a set of prescriptions that, because of their inher-
ent unworkability, could not possibly alter the performance of
management for the better.
Moreover, the threat of punishment contained in the Draft
provides no realistic solution for resolving the real problems of cor-
porate governance. Despite the protections of the business judg-
ment rule, the liabilities imposed by the ALI Draft would paralyze
the processes of the board, which already barely gets the job done.
The possibility that an innocuous decision made today might be
discovered by a court to be wrapped in asbestos some years later,
could inhibit the board's decisionmaking under the pressures of
time. The safe harbor provisions of the business judgment rule ap-
ply only to "deliberative" decisions. 6 These provisions ignore the
role of hindsight in assessing the importance of certain decisions.
Uncertainty, risk, untested innovation, and above all, the pressures
of shortage of time surround managers and directors in their deci-
sionmaking. No major decision can await perfect information.
I hope the ALI Reporters will not dismiss the detailed re-
sponses by critics to recommendations considered impracticable17
as prejudiced. The legal community's suspicion of business should
not be the basis for refuting the charge of unworkability and irrele-
vance. Inquiry into the present-day role and function of the corpo-
rate board of directors reveals the need for more sophisticated
leadership of boards of directors and better ways to improve the
15. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, pt. VII, ch. 1 introductory note A, at 225 (citing Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)). Professor Coffee is the Reporter
for Part VII of the ALI Draft.
16. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 4.01(d) comment a, at 144.
17. See, e.g., THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 3.
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combined capacity of their membership. But if the Reporters want
to address the problems of corporate governance, they must first
understand them; the difficulties do not derive from self-interest.
As an organ of governance, the board has only recently as-
sumed great importance. In the large publicly held corporation, the
board becomes the highest authority because the shareholders
rarely want the real power to elect directors. Typically, the share-
holders follow the board's recommendations in those matters still
archaically put to shareholder vote. In effect, it is the board that
exercises the power and responsibility of ownership. If any entity
owns the corporation, it is the board. Neither alumni, students,
faculty, nor the community own a university; in reality, the trust-
ees are the "owners" who must be sensitive to the needs and
desires of its constituents. Similarly, a corporate board has ulti-
mate responsibility for the management, perpetuation, and devel-
opment of its corporation. A theory of the board's function is de-
veloping along with the changes in the corporation. The board
finds itself bound to take the interests of all the corporation's con-
stituents, including investors, into account as it asks for and rati-
fies management's strategic decisions.
The corporation has indeed outgrown its archaic definition in
corporation law; the new board, its functions defined by experi-
ence, has become the custodian of the legitimacy of the large cor-
poration. When the large corporation maintains acceptance by its
customers, suppliers, and employees, it has attained legitimacy.
Additionally, legitimacy requires that the corporation comply with
a multitude of specific regulations and rules of disclosure, contend
successfully against local competition, and develop its own capabil-
ity against increasingly demanding world competition. The corpo-
ration meets these requirements when governed by forces shaped
and responded to by a board and management working in tandem.
It is unthinkable that, except in periods of crisis, an adver-
sarial relationship should divide independent directors and manag-
ers. The relationship between chief executive officers ("CEO's")
and their boards is a paradoxical one. Boards must support man-
agement's leadership of the corporation; at the same time, they
must evaluate management. Latent tension, mutual respect, and
the imminence of challenge condition this relationship in ways that
must be experienced to be understood. The effectiveness of the
board, the quality of its membership, and the participation of
outside directors in objective examination of the proposals of the
CEO are all in the hands of the chairman of the board. Although
[Vol. 37:213
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the formalities of board composition, structure, and function can
be legislated, the important elements of professional skill, vision,
and responsibility comprising board leadership and effectiveness
defy legislative mandates.
The evolution of the board's recognition of its de facto impor-
tance in corporate governance has a long way to go. The remaining
problems include the extent to which boards are asked and made
able to contribute to the quality of strategic decision, the sensitiv-
ity of the relationships in which compensation and evaluation of
performance take place, and the difficulty of setting a climate in
which challenging discussion can occur without causing antagonism
between management and the board. The major problem is the
shortage of time available to outside directors for discussions about
the types of questions that they should raise. The recommenda-
tions made by the Draft do not address these problems; the adop-
tion of these recommendations would worsen the problems.
My own dismay over the widening gulf between corporate
management and the corporate bar and segments of the academic
and regulatory bar leads me now, as an educator, to wonder why
the study of the formulation and execution of business policy is
not a mandatory part of the required curriculum in our law
schools. We have a bicameral Congress made up of law school
graduates. Congress is served by committee staffs of young lawyers
and surrounded by government agencies also composed largely of
lawyers. We have at the head of an increasingly litigious society
proportionately more lawyers than anywhere in the world. How
has this army of high talent been indoctrinated with respect to the
motives and responsibilities of corporate management? What are
they taught about the limitations of the adversarial process (and
its companion curse, the false dichotomy) as a way of solving mul-
tidimensional problems? What alternatives to the highly theoreti-
cal constraints of the branch of economics called industrial organi-
zation do they encounter?
The formulation and implementation of corporate strategy is a
field of study that law students-initially surprised at the intellec-
tual challenge of the business leadership and the technical, organi-
zational, and human skills required-would find intensely interest-
ing. But beyond this provincial suggestion, let me conclude with
the hope that supporters of the Draft interpret the controversy
over the ALI Draft, not as the outraged defense of inescapable
privilege, but as a sign of a widening gulf that must be narrowed
and bridged. The worlds of management and the law are too im-
19831
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portant to be at war. Social justice and freedom of initiative are
two of the most important objectives of a democratic society. The
problems of legitimacy, professional competence, and professional
responsibility, in both worlds, have multiplied in complexity to ex-
haust the usefulness of old models from economics and political
science. We should mount a serious inquiry from the combined
points of view of law and management into the nature of these
problems. We should not poke at them with white canes.
